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Can Europe recover without credit? 
Zsolt Darvas 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which 
the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP 
trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent 
per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. 
However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation 
are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in 
high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. 
European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply 
played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to 
believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan 
supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a 
minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were 
associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far 
in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish 
economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth 
does not return. 
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Talpra állhat-e Európa hitel nélkül? 
Zsolt Darvas 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
135 ország öt évtizednyi adata azt mutatja, hogy nem számítanak ritka eseményeknek a 
hitelezés nélküli gazdasági fellendülések (amelyek során a hitelek reálállománya három 
évvel a GDP mélypontja után érte el a válság előtti szintet). Ezek a fellndülések jelentős reál 
GDP-növekedés mellett következtek be: évi 4,7 százalék volt a közepes jövedelmű 
országokban és évi 3,2 százalékot ért el a magas jövedelmű országokban. Ugyanakkor e 
történelmi epizódokból két fő ok miatt csak korlátozott érvényű következtetéseket lehet 
levonni a jelenlegi európai helyzetre vonatkozóan. Először is a hitelezés nélküli gazdasági 
fellendülések sokkal kevésbé gyakoriak a magas jövedelmű országokban, mint a pénzügyileg 
fejletlen, alacsony jövedelmű országokban. Az európai gazdaságok erősen függenek a banki 
hitelektől és a kutatási eredmények azt mutatják, hogy a hitelkínálat jelentős szerepet 
játszott az elmúlt időszak gyenge hitelezési teljesítményében Európában. Jó okunk van azt 
hinni, hogy a különböző erőfeszítések ellenére a normális hitelezés még nem állt helyre. A 
korlátozott hitelkínálat meggátolhatja Európai gazdasági kilábalását, és a hitelviszonyt 
megtestesítő értékpapírok kibocsátása csak szerény mértékben helyettesítette a banki 
hiteleket. Másodszor, a hitelezés nélküli gazdasági fellendülések a múltban jelentős 
reálárfolyam leértékelődéssel jártak, ez azonban alig következett be a legtöbb európai 
országban. Ez a stilizált tény azt sugallja, hogy nehezen alakulhat ki a gazdasági kilábalás 
jelentős mértékű reálárfolyam leértékelődés nélkül, ha a hitelezés növekedése nem indul el. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: hitelezés nélküli gazdasági fellendülések, hitelnövekedés, pénzügyi 
struktúra, reálárfolyam igazodás 
 
 
JEL kódok: E32, E44, E51, F31, G21, O40 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Access to finance is a crucial prerequisite for growth. Beyond using existing cash balances, 
retaining profits and raising new equity, options that are typically limited during a 
recession, borrowing can provide funds for day-to-day financial operations and long-term 
investment. 
In continental Europe, borrowing from banks is the dominant source of debt financing 
for non-financial corporations, and there has been little change in this during the past 
decade (Figure 1). In contrast, the share of debt securities is much higher in the United 
States and the issuance of debt securities overcompensated for the drop in bank credit from 
2008 to 2011.1 Developments in the United Kingdom are in between the euro area and the 
US in these regards, while in other EU countries, bank loans tend to dominate even more 
than in the euro area. 
Credit growth has not yet resumed in most European countries, and credit is even 
declining in nominal terms in a number of countries. The declines in real terms are more 
significant. Clearly, economic growth and credit growth are simultaneous and it is not just 
that credit can drive the economy, but the reverse causality also exists. Economic growth 
can increase both credit demand (households and corporations are more willing to consume 
and invest when the economic outlook improves) and credit supply (economic growth 
improves bank balance sheets and thereby their ability to supply credit). Yet there is 
abundant academic research concluding that limitations in credit supply have played a 
major role in credit developments recently, and such supply constraints could hinder credit 
expansion even if higher credit demand returns. Given the prominent role of credit in the 
European economy and the limited substitution of bank loans with debt securities, one 
should be concerned about the consequences for economic growth. 
However, while economic theory predicts a close association between credit supply and 
the business cycle, recent empirical literature has pointed out that there were a number of 
economic recoveries without credit growth, which are called ‘creditless recoveries’. Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Talvi (2006a, b) were among the first to observe this phenomenon by 
studying a sample of emerging market economies after systemic sudden stops. They dubbed 
such developments ‘Phoenix miracles’ and showed that such recoveries are common, even 
though investment, a key driver of growth in normal times, remains weak in creditless 
recoveries. 
                                                        
1 Since the debt securities market is accessible for large firms only, total debt liabilities of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) might not have increased, even in the US. 
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Subsequent research, such as Claesens, Kose and Terrones (2009a,b), International 
Monetary Fund (2009), Abiad, Dell'Ariccia and Li (2011), Bijsterbosch and Dahlhaus (2011), 
and Coricelli and Roland (2011), has looked at various other aspects of creditless (and also 
with-credit) recoveries. These studies have concluded that creditless recoveries are not rare 
events (they account for about every fifth recovery), but growth is about a third lower (ie 4.5 
percent per year on average during the first three years of the recovery, as calculated by 
Abiad, Dell'Ariccia and Li, 2011) than in recoveries with credit (when average growth was 
found to be 6.3 percent per year). Creditless recoveries are typically preceded by banking 
crises and sizeable output falls. Industries that are more reliant on external finance grow 
disproportionately less during creditless recoveries. Several papers also conclude that 
impaired financial intermediation and limited credit supply are the major reasons behind 
sluggish credit growth during creditless recoveries. 
Given this cautiously optimistic literature on the existence of creditless recoveries, it is 
relevant to ask if European economies could also expect to grow without credit in the 
coming years. This question also has a bearing on the current debate on the targets and 
implementation speed of the Basel III requirements, since new capital, liquidity and 
leverage rules will likely impact on the ability of banks to supply credit to the economy. 
The goal of this Policy Contribution is to shed light on some less researched aspects of 
creditless recoveries: the role of exchange rate changes and financial development. After 
establishing some stylised facts using a sample of 135 countries and almost five decades of 
data, we assess the potential for creditless recoveries in Europe. 
 
2. CREDITLESS RECOVERIES IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: 
A NEW LOOK 
 
In our view, real exchange rate developments could play a major role in understanding 
creditless recoveries, yet the literature has not paid sufficient attention to this issue. While 
dummy variables indicating the existence of a currency crisis were included in some papers, 
this indicator does not capture the magnitude and persistence of exchange rate changes. In 
addition, exchange rates also changed in those cases that are not classified as currency 
crises. 
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For example, Figure 2 shows that all four ‘true miracles’ identified by Abiad, Dell'Ariccia 
and Li (2011), ie cases with exceptional high economic growth without cumulative real 
credit growth three years after the trough, were characterised by very large falls in the real 
exchange rate close to the GDP trough. 
In addition to bringing the real exchange rate into the analysis, we also include trade 
openness and financial development. Trade openness may have a bearing on the impact of 
the exchange rate on the economy, while financial development may directly impact the 
incidence of creditless recoveries. For example, economies in their financial infancy might 
not be much impacted by the availability or the lack of credit, but credit constraints could be 
disruptive when companies rely heavily on credit.2 
 
Sample 
 
Our sample includes annual data from 1960 for 135 countries for which data on output, 
credit and real effective exchange rate (REER) are available.3 We have excluded the period 
of the recent global crisis from the sample to search for recoveries (ie do not consider 
troughs during 2007-2012), but we use GDP data up to 2017 from the October 2012 forecast 
of the IMF in order to reduce the end-of-sample problem of the Hodrick-Prescott filter.4 We 
have excluded transition countries (up to the mid-1990s) and Middle Eastern oil exporting 
countries, since the transition was characterised by enormous structural changes and the 
economies of oil exporters substantially differ from the economies of EU countries. 
 
Definitions of business cycle trough and creditless recoveries 
 
Similarly to Braun and Larrain (2005),  Abiad, Dell'Ariccia and Li (2011) and Bijsterbosch 
and Dahlhaus (2011), we define the trough of the business cycle as the lowest point of the 
cyclical component of real GDP identified by the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing 
                                                        
2 Abiad, Dell'Ariccia and Li (2011) mention, incidentally, that creditless recoveries are more common 
in countries with less developed financial markets. 
3 We have checked 178 countries and the main bottleneck was the availability of credit data. 
4 The filter developed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) is a statistical method for decomposing a time 
series into trend and cyclical components. It is based on the assumption that the trend component is 
smooth and the smoothness can be set by altering a parameter. One problem with the filter is end-of-
sample instability: when new observations are added, the estimated trend and cyclical components 
for the last few observations of the previous sample can change significantly. 
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parameter 6.25, which is the suggestion of Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annual data. We only 
consider those troughs for which the lowest point of the cyclical component is below zero by 
more than its standard deviation. The recovery period is defined as the first three years 
following the trough. We required at least four years between subsequent troughs. The 
recovery is defined as ‘creditless’ when the level of real credit stock (Claims on private 
sector, IFS line 32D5, deflated with the consumer price index) for three years after the 
trough is lower than in the year of trough.6 
 
The two main tables 
 
Table 1 on the next page shows some main characteristics of both creditless and with-credit 
recoveries. We report median values of the various indicators, because there are a number 
of outliers in our sample. Table 2 reports test statistics checking the significance of the 
difference between the median values of the indicators for creditless and with-credit 
recoveries. In addition to total, we report statistics for three income groups based on GDP 
per capita relative to the US in the trough year: below 10 percent, between 10 and 60 
percent, and above 60 percent and hereafter call these groups low-income, middle-income 
and high-income, respectively. Currently, EU countries would belong to the middle- and 
high-income groups and therefore we focus on these groups.7 
 
Incidence of creditless recoveries 
 
There are 428 recoveries in our sample of which 82 are creditless, ie about every fifth 
recovery. The incidence of creditless recoveries is highest in low-income countries (25.3 
                                                        
5 As emphasised by Abiad, Dell'Ariccia and Li (2011), the IFS credit data has shortcomings: it does 
not include credit extended by non-bank financial intermediaries, and also does not include 
borrowing from abroad. But this is the only source with sufficient time and country coverage. 
6 Note that the Argentine and the Chilean episodes shown in Figure 2 just marginally pass this 
criterion. 
7 The level of a country’s development has a major bearing on growth drivers, see eg Veugelers (2011), 
justifying the focus on high- and middle-income countries when we wish to draw lessons for EU 
countries. Considering GDP per capita at PPP in 2013, as projected by the IMF October 2012 World 
Economic Outlook, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal and all twelve member states that joined the EU 
in 2004 and 2007 would belong to the middle income middle-group. Croatia, the 28th EU member 
from July 2013, would also belong to this group. The other eleven EU member states would be in the 
high-income group. 
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percent) and lowest in high-income countries (12.8 percent).8 In high-income countries, 
there were only 12 cases of creditless recoveries, the most recent in 1993, as indicated in 
Table A1 of the Appendix.9 
 
Growth 
 
Table 1 confirms the results from the literature that economic growth tends to be 
remarkable during the first three years of creditless recoveries (4.5 percent per year 
averaged across the full sample), even though it is less rapid than in recoveries with credit 
(6.0 percent). In high-income countries, the median speed of economic growth during the 
first three years of creditless recoveries is also impressive, 3.2 percent per year, just below 
the 4.1 percent annual growth rate during recoveries with credit. 
Yet the GDP growth rate may not be the best indicator for assessing the speed of 
recovery, because the global growth environment likely has an impact. Table 1 shows that 
GDP growth of trading partners used to be somewhat faster in recoveries with credit, 
though the difference is not large. Growth relative to trading partners was 2.7 percent 
during with-credit recoveries in low- and middle-income countries, and only 1.2 percent 
during creditless recoveries, which is still quite substantial. In high-income countries, the 
difference between growth relative to trading partners of the two types of recoveries is 
smaller. 
 
Financial development 
 
We measured financial development using the credit/GDP ratio, which is an imperfect 
measure, but the only one available for a large number of countries across several decades. 
The median of this indicator is practically identical for creditless and with-credit recoveries, 
and therefore within an income group, financial development does not seem to make a 
difference for the incidence of creditless recoveries. However, Table 1 also confirms that 
economic and financial developments correlate positively and we have already found that 
                                                        
8 These results are consistent with the findings of Abiad, Dell’Ariccia and Li (2011), who analyse 362 
recoveries. 
9 Note that we classify countries according to GDP per capita at PPP relative to the US in the year of 
trough, and therefore the twelve high-income countries with creditless recoveries also include the 
Bahamas in 1975 and Gabon in 1978 (see Appendix 2). 
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the incidence of creditless recoveries declines with the level of economic development. 
Therefore, we can also conclude that creditless recoveries are rare at a higher level of 
financial development, which is confirmed by Figure 3.  
 
Current account  
 
Next, Table 1 indicates the magnitude of current account adjustment, which is defined as 
the difference between the maximum of current account/GDP positions during the three 
years after the trough, minus the minimum during the three years before the trough. 
Creditless recoveries are associated with greater current account adjustment, by about 3 
percentage points of GDP, in all three income groups. 
 
Real exchange rate 
 
Current account adjustments are facilitated by adjustment in the real exchange rate. Table 1 
shows that all recoveries in all three income groups tended to be associated with lasting real 
effective exchange rate depreciations, and depreciations tended to be greater in creditless 
recoveries compared to with-credit recoveries, except in low-income countries. The 
difference in median cases of creditless and with-credit recoveries is significant (Table 2). In 
the middle-income countries, the median real effective depreciation is 24 percent from the 
pre-trough peak until three years after the trough in the creditless cases, and only seven 
percent in the with-credit cases. The same figures for high-income countries are 10 percent 
and two percent. And in several cases, part of the depreciation was corrected by the third 
year after the trough. 
However, while creditless recoveries tend to be accompanied by sizeable and durable 
real exchange rate depreciations, this is not always the case. Figure 4 indicates that the 
median real exchange rate clearly tends downward during creditless recoveries in middle-
income countries, but the upper boundary of the interquartile range remains close to 100, 
implying that there was no depreciation in about every fourth creditless recovery. Among 
the high-income countries, in two of the 12 cases the real exchange rate was at a higher level 
three years after the trough than the maximum before the trough.  
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Consequently, not all, but most, creditless recoveries are associated with sizeable and 
durable real exchange rate depreciations, and the median depreciation is significantly larger 
than the depreciation during recoveries with credit in middle- and high-income countries. 
 
Trade openness 
 
Finally, we also checked if creditless recoveries emerged in countries more open to 
international trade, but this is not the case. If anything, countries with with-credit 
recoveries are somewhat more open (Table 1), but the difference is not significant (Table 2).  
 
 
3. UNDERSTANDING CREDITLESS RECOVERIES 
 
As Abiad, Dell'Ariccia and Li (2011) rightly argue, creditless recoveries are puzzling from a 
theoretical perspective. While Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2006a), and Biggs, Mayer and 
Pick (2009) sketch brief analytical models, it is fair to claim that comprehensive theoretical 
models have not been developed to understand creditless recoveries. Instead, authors 
studying such recoveries put forward certain hypotheses to explain them, as follows: 
 
• Absorption of idle capacities: creditless recoveries used to happen after deep recessions 
and thereby idle capacities are available for growth: firms could exploit these capacities 
without investing (eg Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2006a, b; Abiad, Dell'Ariccia and Li, 
2011; and Coricelli and Roland, 2011);10 
• Role of liquidity: following a liquidity crunch, liquidity is restored by discontinuing 
investment projects, meaning that firms do not borrow (eg Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 
2006a, b); 
• Incorrect measurement of credit developments: the change in credit growth may matter 
more for output growth than credit growth itself. When, for example, credit falls sharply 
in the trough year, but credit growth stabilises in the next year (even if at a negative 
growth rate), then the change in credit growth is positive in the year after the trough, and 
that may help economic recovery (Biggs, Mayer and Pick, 2009); 
                                                        
10 The results of the probit model estimates of Bijsterbosch and Dahlhaus (2011) are consistent with 
this interpretation, since they find that among the statistically significant variables linked to the 
incidence of creditless recoveries, two variables, the preceding output fall and the occurrence of a 
banking crises, are economically significant. 
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• Alternative financing: firms can rely on alternative sources of financing, such as trade 
credit (eg Claessens et al, 2009; Coricelli and Roland, 2011); 
• Reallocation: a reallocation from more to less credit-intensive sectors takes place (eg 
Claessens et al, 2009; Abiad, Dell'Ariccia and Li, 2011; Coricelli and Roland, 2011); 
• Strong external demand: disruptions to the supply of credit may not matter much for 
firms that are highly dependent on outside funding, if they produce goods that are highly 
tradable (IMF, 2009). 
 
These explanations could all be valid to some extent, except perhaps the last one, 
because, as we found in Tables 1 and 2, GDP growth of trading partners tended to be faster 
in recoveries with credit. But our preceding analysis underlined that one more factor has to 
be added: 
 
• Real exchange rate depreciation: can help finance exporting firms via increased trade 
revenues. 
 
We cannot claim causality – that the weak real exchange rate causes output to recover 
when credit does not expand – because GDP growth, credit growth and the real exchange 
rate are endogenous variables and we do not have a well identified formal model to back us 
up. Yet the stylised fact we established suggests that economic growth may prove to be 
difficult in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not 
return. 
 
 
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE 
 
Before the crisis, there was probably too much bank credit in several European countries. 
But the stock of bank loans at the end of 2011 was either similar to the 2008 stock or even 
lower in all countries and areas indicated in Table 3. The only notable nominal increase can 
be observed in the seven central and eastern European countries outside the euro area 
(CEE7). But this is largely due to the revaluation effect of foreign currency loans, because 
currency exchange rates depreciated in Hungary, Poland and Romania, where foreign 
currency loans were widespread. In real terms, there was a fall in all areas and countries 
indicated in the table. 
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Two major issues have to be discussed for the assessment of the potential for creditless 
recoveries in Europe: the role of supply and demand in credit contraction, and the potential 
for alternative source of financing beyond bank loans. 
 
Credit supply and demand 
 
The fall in credit aggregates could be related to both credit supply and credit demand, but 
also the writing-down of loans: 
 
• Credit supply: banks facing a deteriorating loan portfolio during a recession can tighten 
credit standards and reduce credit supply. New requirements for higher capital and 
liquidity ratios and lower leverage can also lead to a reduction of credit. 
• Credit demand: with the fall in output and increased uncertainty about the outlook, firms 
reduce their production and investment activities, and thereby reducing credit demand. 
Also, highly indebted firms may wish to deleverage during a downturn. 
• Write-downs: in a recession bankruptcies increase and banks suffer losses on their loan 
portfolios and write-down some claims, which also reduces the aggregate stock of loans. 
 
All three factors can play a role during creditless recoveries and from a policy 
perspective they have different implications. However, several research papers suggest that 
credit supply had a major role, both during earlier creditless recovery episodes and during 
the current episode of sluggish credit development. 
Regarding earlier episodes, it was found that industries that are more dependent on 
external finance are hit harder during recessions (a finding corroborated by Braun and 
Larrain, 2005) and these industries recover disproportionately less during a creditless 
recovery than those that are more self-financed (a finding of Abiad, Dell'Ariccia and Li, 
2011). When bank loans, debt securities and equity are not perfect substitutes, these 
findings suggest that impaired financial intermediation, and hence limitations in credit 
supply, was a major reason for past creditless recoveries. 
There is also abundant academic research concluding that recently, limited credit supply 
was an important factor in credit developments in several advanced economies. Hampell 
and Sorensen (2010) adopt a panel-econometric approach applied to a unique confidential 
dataset of results from the Eurosystem’s bank lending survey, and conclude that even after 
controlling for various demand-side factors, loan growth is negatively affected by supply-
side constraints. Using a different technique – panel vector autoregression identified with 
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sign restrictions – Hristov, Hülsewig and Wollmershäuser (2012) find that that loan-supply 
shocks significantly contributed to the evolution of the loan volume and real GDP growth in 
euro-area member countries during the financial crisis. The role of credit supply is also 
corroborated by country-specific studies, for example for Italy by Del Giovane et al (2012) 
and for Spain by Jiménez et al (2012). 
Empirical results for non-euro area countries are similar. Aiyar (2011) looked at UK 
banks using detailed confidential balance sheet data reported to the Bank of England, and 
found that shocks to foreign funding caused a substantial pullback in domestic lending.  
Using US firm-level data, Becker and Ivashina (2011) interpret switching by firms from 
loans to bonds as a contraction in credit supply, conditional on the issuance of new debt. 
They find strong evidence of substitution of loans by bonds during periods characterised by 
tight lending standards, high levels of non-performing loans and loan allowances, low bank 
share prices and tight monetary policy. They also find that this substitution behaviour has 
predictive power for bank borrowing and investment of small (out-of-sample) firms, which 
are not able to issue bonds. In a related paper, Adrian, Colla and Shin (2012) also document 
the shift from loans to bonds in the composition of credit in the US, and argue that the 
impact on real activity comes from the spike in risk premiums, rather than contraction in 
the total quantity of credit. Gertler (2012) adds, by sketching a simple conceptual 
framework, that credit spreads are a more useful indicator of credit supply disruptions than 
credit quantities. Gertler (2012) cites Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), who conclude that the 
increase in spreads during the recent financial crisis was likely symptomatic of unusual 
financial distress, and not just the reflection of the increased default risk faced by 
borrowers.11 
Certainly, the above-mentioned studies analysed data that was available at the time of 
writing and therefore their sample periods end between 2009 and 2011. Since then, a 
number of attempts were made by European governments and the European Central Bank 
to help restoring normal lending and therefore the finding that credit supply was limited up 
to 2009 or 2011 may not necessarily imply that such limitations exit now as well. However, 
European banks still suffer from a large, €400 billion, capital shortfall according to the 
OECD (2013); the share of non-performing loans continues to be high; bank share prices 
are low even after the recent increases; and banks need to meet tight capital, liquidity and 
leverage requirements, even though some of the Basel III requirements were relaxed in 
                                                        
11 These authors argue that a credit supply disruption emerges when banks take losses on their loan 
portfolio, leading to large losses on their equity capital. Tightening of bank credits increases the 
demand for open market credit by non-financial firms, which, in conjunction with financial frictions, 
leads to an increase in open market interest rates as well. 
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January 2013 (Basel Committee, 2013). These factors suggest that credit supply may remain 
constrained in the EU. 
 
Substitution of bank loans 
While there was notable substitution of bank loans with debt securities in the US, this was 
not really the case in continental Europe, as Figure 1 indicated for the aggregate of the euro 
area.12 Figure 5 shows the share of loans in debt liabilities of EU countries (including 
Croatia) in 2008 and 2011. The country-specific evidence confirms the main message that 
the issuance of securities has hardly replaced loans in continental Europe. Note that since 
we are using balance sheet data, all kinds of loans, and not just loans from domestic banks, 
are included. 
Lack of substitution of bank loans with debt securities is a typical problem in bank-
based economies, and likely has an implication for the speed of economic recovery. By 
studying 84 recoveries in 17 OECD countries between 1960-2007, Allard and Balvy (2011) 
found that market-based economies experience significantly and durably stronger rebounds 
than the bank-based economies.13  
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The literature on creditless recoveries is cautiously optimistic, concluding that while they 
are not optimal because of weak investment performance, they are not rare and the speed of 
recovery is still impressive. We also found, by studying historical episodes of economic 
recoveries in 135 countries during the past five decades, that average yearly real GDP 
growth during the first three years after the trough was 4.7 percent per year in middle-
                                                        
12 See Bijlsma and Zwart (2013) for a comprehensive account of the mega-trends of financial 
intermediation in Europe. 
13 However, they also found that stronger recoveries tend to be associated with greater economic 
flexibility. When employment and product market flexibility are taken into account, the comparative 
advantage of market-based economies in recoveries is less significant and therefore it is difficult to 
claim causality. 
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income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries.14 Many policymakers 
would probably be very happy if real GDP growth could reach such rates now. 
However, we have drawn a sceptical conclusion on the implications of the historical 
episodes of creditless recoveries for current European circumstances, for two major reasons.  
First, the incidence of creditless recoveries is much lower in high-income countries, 
which are characterised by high levels of financial development, than in low-income 
countries in their financial infancy. Since most European countries heavily depend on bank 
loans, credit constraints could be disruptive. Also, in contrast to the US, where the issuance 
of debt securities compensated for the withdrawal of bank loans, there has been rather 
limited substitution in continental Europe.  
Furthermore, the issuance of debt securities is not an option for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), which account for a significant share of the total number of firms, 
and play a crucial role in economic growth and employment. A recent report from the OECD 
(2012) showed that during the recent credit crunch, SMEs were harder hit than big firms 
and faced more severe lending conditions. Access to finance thus remains vital for the 
creation, growth and survival of SMEs. Consequently, pursuing further policies to restore 
the ability of banks to lend is vital. 
Second, during historical episodes of creditless recoveries, exchange rate depreciation 
have likely played a role by increasing revenues from foreign trade, which could have 
supported company financing when access to credit was limited. We found that while both 
creditless and with-credit recoveries tend to be associated with real exchange rate 
depreciation, the depreciation was significantly larger and more persistent during creditless 
recoveries. In middle-income countries, the median depreciation of the consumer price 
index-based REER from the pre-crisis peak to three years after the trough was 24 percent, 
but during with-credit recoveries it was 7 percent. In high-income countries, the same 
numbers are 10 percent (creditless) and 2 percent (with-credit).  
Since the current global financial and economic crisis erupted, the depreciation in most 
euro-area countries fell short of these benchmarks. In Ireland, a high-income country, the 
15 percent depreciation from pre-crisis peak to 2012 was greater than the benchmark, and 
the depreciations in Germany (9 percent), the Netherlands (8 percent), Finland (8 percent) 
and France (8 percent) are not far from it. But the depreciations in Italy (6 percent), Spain 
(5 percent), Portugal (5 percent) and Greece (4 percent) are far below the benchmark for the 
                                                        
14 These growth rates are high even though they are lower than growth during recoveries with credit. 
Also, when looking at growth relative to the growth of trading partners, creditless recoveries were less 
speedy than growth during recoveries with credit, yet still impressive: there was a 1.2 percent extra 
growth relative to trading partners in middle income countries and a 0.5 percent growth shortfall 
relative to trading partners in high income countries. 
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middle-income country group, ie the group to which they belong.15 Unfortunately, these 
southern European countries are also those that experience sizeable contractions in the 
outstanding stock of bank loans to non-financial corporations and therefore they face the 
double challenge of limited real exchange rate depreciation and sizeable contraction in 
credit.16 
We did not set up a causal model and hence cannot claim that the real exchange rate 
depreciation was a cause of creditless recoveries, because GDP growth, credit growth and 
the real exchange rate are endogenous variables. Yet the stylised facts we established 
suggest that if credit growth does not return, economic recovery may prove to be difficult in 
the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation. 
 
 
 
                                                        
15 In some of these southern euro-area members, the unit labour cost-based REER index depreciated 
more than the consumer prices index-based REER, even when controlling for the changing 
composition of the economy (Darvas (2012b). Unfortunately, the fall in unit labour costs was largely 
the result of massive lay-offs (Darvas (2012b), and did not translate into a fall in prices, as discussed 
by Wolff (2012). 
16 In Italy, the real stock of credit to non-financial corporations remained broadly stable until mid-
2011, when it started to fall by about 8 percent until end-2012. This cumulative decline is smaller 
than the declines in Greece, Portugal and Spain and is similar in magnitude to what happened more 
gradually in Germany between 2008 and 2012. 
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APPENDIX 1: DATA SOURCES FOR THE CALCULATIONS IN SECTION 2 
 
 
GDP: GDP at constant prices is from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) October 
2012 for 1980-2017 (when available). Missing data and earlier data was chained to the WEO 
data from IMF International Financial Statistics, World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI), EBRD and the Maddison dataset. 
 
GDP of trading partners: for each country we calculated the weighted average of real GDP 
growth of trading partners, using country-specific weights derived on the basis of Bayoumi, 
Lee and Jaewoo (2006). Due to missing data (mostly for transition economies before 1990), 
we calculated two indices: one using GDP data of 145 countries, which is available form 
1960, and another one using GDP data of 175 countries for recoveries in 1993 and later. 
 
GDP per capita at PPP (purchasing power parity) relative to the United States: the main 
source of GDP per capita at PPP is the October 2012 IMF WEO, which includes data for 
1980-2017 with some gaps for some countries. The figures relative to the U.S. were 
calculated from this database for 1980-2017. Missing values during from 1980, and values 
before 1980, were approximated by calculating the change in real GDP per capita relative to 
the US and chaining this ratio to the most recent data available on relative GDP per capital 
at PPP in the IMF WEO. Real GDP growth rates are from the sources described above, while 
population data is from World Bank WDI. 
 
Credit: ‘Claims on private sector’, line 32D, from IMF International Financial Statistics. 
 
Credit/GDP: nominal credit divided by nominal GDP, which is from the IMF World 
Economic outlook October 2012 and IMF International Financial Statistics. 
 
Real credit: nominal credit deflated by the consumer price index, which is from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics. 
 
Real effective exchange rate: updated database of Darvas (2012a). Due to missing data, we 
have calculated the real effective exchange rate against four different country groups: 
against 172 countries for 1993-2012, against 145 countries for 1980-2012, against 99 
countries for 1970-2012 and against 67 countries for 1960-2012. For each case of recovery, 
we use the broadest available REER. 
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Exports and Imports (% GDP): for most countries, data is available in the IMF International 
Financial Statistics for all three variables (exports of goods and services, imports of goods 
and services, and GDP; all are at current prices). Missing data for exports and imports were 
filled from UNCTAD. 
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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF CREDITLESS RECOVERIES 
 
High income 
countries  
Middle income 
countries  Low income countries 
Norway 1990  Greece 1987  Guyana 1990 
United States 1991  Barbados 1973  Congo, Rep. 1987 
Denmark 1975  Gabon 1987  Philippines 1985 
France 1993  Portugal 1986  Ivory Coast 1984 
Italy 1993  Portugal 1975  Indonesia 1998 
Hong Kong 1998  Mexico 1983  Sri Lanka 1989 
Sweden 1993  Trinidad and Tobago 1984  Djibouti 1996 
United Kingdom 1975  Jamaica 1976  Madagascar 1973 
Bahamas 1975  Mexico 1995  Senegal 1983 
Gabon 1978  Malta 1974  Ghana 1976 
Finland 1993  Malaysia 1998  Papua New Guinea 1997 
Iceland 1961  Argentina 1990  Ivory Coast 1992 
  Brazil 1992  Cameroon 1994 
  Argentina 2002  Papua New Guinea 1990 
  Uruguay 1985  Niger 1969 
  Botswana 1994  Pakistan 1972 
  Uruguay 2002  Nigeria 1987 
  Suriname 1993  Tanzania 1965 
  Chile 1983  Tanzania 1969 
  Ecuador 1983  Sierra Leone 1992 
  Colombia 1985  Tanzania 1974 
  Guyana 1973  Comoros 1991 
  Paraguay 1983  Benin 1989 
  Colombia 1999  Central African Republic 1983 
  Tonga 1989  Zambia 1995 
  Ecuador 1987  Guinea Bissau 1998 
  Thailand 1998  Mali 1978 
  Ecuador 1999  Haiti 2004 
  Botswana 1977  Togo 1993 
  Paraguay 2002  Uganda 1980 
  Belize 1982  Tanzania 1994 
  Western Samoa 1991  Malawi 1981 
    Burkina Faso 1990 
    Burundi 1980 
    Sierra Leone 1997 
    Sudan 1985 
    Sudan 1996 
    Malawi 1994 
Note: the cases are ordered according to GDP per capita in the year of trough. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 
Debt liabilities of non-financial corporations, 1999Q1-2012Q3 
A. Euro area (€ billions)        B. United Kingdom (₤ billions)      C: United States ($ 
billions) 
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Source: author’s calculations based on OECD 'Non-consolidated financial balance sheets by 
economic sector'. Note: quarterly balance sheet data. Debt securities correspond to 'Securities 
other than shares, excluding financial derivatives'. 
 
Figure 2 
Examples of credit-less recoveries, the four ‘true miracles’  
(year of trough = 100) 
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Sources: author’s calculations using data listed in the data appendix. Note: real credit is credit to 
the private sector deflated using the consumer price index. REER = real effective exchange rate, 
which was calculated against 145 trading partners for Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay and against 
99 trading partners for Chile using trade weights and consumer prices. 
 24 
 
Figure 3 
Histogram of the credit/GDP ratios  
of the 82 creditless recoveries 
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Source: author’s calculations. Note: the four cases with more than 
100 percent of GDP credit stock are Hong Kong in 1989 (169 
percent), Malaysia in 1998 (156 percent), Thailand in 1998 (156 
percent) and in Portugal 1975 (106 percent). In these cases the 
depreciation of the real exchange rate in three years after the trough 
compared to the pre-crisis peak was 8 percent, 16 percent, 58 
percent and 18 percent, respectively. 
Figure 4 
REER developments during creditless recoveries in middle- and high-income 
countries (pre-trough peak in REER = 100) 
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Source: Author’s calculations. Note. The pre-trough peak in real effective exchange rates 
occurred in different years (see also eg Figure 2: in trough minus one year in Argentina, in 
trough minus two years in Chile and Mexico, and in trough minus three years in Uruguay), and 
therefore the median is not equal 100 in any particular year before trough. The 75 percent and 
the 25 percent refer to the first and third quartiles of the distribution of the REER 
developments (ie denote the boundaries of the interquartile range). 
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Figure 5 
The share of loans in debt liabilities of non-financial corporations in the EU, 
2008 and 2011 
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Source: Eurostat ‘Financial balance sheets’ database. Note: countries are ordered according to the 
share of loans in 2011. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 
 Some key characteristics of creditless and with-credit recoveries 
  Per capita income (% US) 
 
Type of 
recovery 
below 
10% 
betwee
n 10% 
and 
60% 
above 
60% 
All 
Number of recoveries 
credit-less 38 32 12 82 
credit-with 112 152 82 346 
% credit-less 25.3% 17.4% 12.8% 19.2% 
Median real GDP growth (average of three years 
after trough) 
credit-less 4.8 4.7 3.2 4.5 
credit-with 6.4 6.8 4.1 6.0 
Median real GDP growth of trading partners 
(average of three years after trough) 
credit-less 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5 
credit-with 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.8 
Median real GDP growth relative to growth of 
trading partners (average of three years after 
trough) 
credit-less 1.2 1.2 -0.5 0.8 
credit-with 2.7 2.7 -0.1 1.9 
Median credit (% GDP) 
credit-less 15 30 50 27 
credit-with 15 30 52 26 
Median current account adjustment (%GDP) 
credit-less 8.0 8.6 6.5 8.0 
credit-with 5.5 5.7 3.0 4.6 
Median REER in 3 years after trough (%pre-trough 
peak) 
credit-less 93 76 90 86 
credit-with 91 93 98 94 
Median openness (exports+imports, %GDP) 
credit-less 52 56 61 56 
credit-with 54 80 62 63 
Source: author’s calculations. 
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Table 2 
 Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the equality of medians between the 
indicators creditless and with-credit recoveries 
 
Full sample 
Excluding low 
income countries  
 
Median real GDP growth (average of three years after 
trough) 
4.21 3.21 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Median real GDP growth of trading partners (average of 
three years after trough) 
2.78 2.20 
(0.006) (0.028) 
Median real GDP growth relative to growth of trading 
partners (average of three years after trough) 
2.95 2.01 
(0.003) (0.044) 
Median credit (GDP %) 
0.49 0.28 
(0.613) (0.777) 
Median current account adjustment (%GDP) 
4.03 3.75 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Median REER in 3 years after trough (%pre-trough 
peak) 
2.18 2.80 
(0.029) (0.005) 
Median openness (exports+imports, %GDP) 
1.18 1.18 
(0.240) (0.239) 
Source: author’s calculations. Notes: p-values are in parentheses. Test statistics significant at 5 
percent level are in italics. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric statistical 
hypothesis test. 
 
 
Table 3 
Loans to non-financial corporations measured in domestic currency 
(2008=100) 
    2000 2008 2011 
Euro area 17 nominal 56 100 102 
  real 67 100 96 
United Kingdom nominal 41 100 89 
 real 48 100 80 
Denmark nominal 48 100 91 
  real 56 100 86 
Sweden nominal 44 100 101 
 real 51 100 96 
Central and  nominal 33 100 110 
Eastern Europe 7 real 45 100 98 
Source: author’s calculations using data from the ‘Financial balance sheets’ 
and ‘Harmonised indices of consumer prices’ databases of Eurostat and the 
‘Non-consolidated financial balance sheets by economic sector’ database of 
the OECD. Note: CEE7 is the aggregate of the seven countries in central 
and eastern Europe that are not members of the euro area: Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. 
 
